Causes and Consequences of Expectation Trajectories:

“High” on Optimism in a Public Referendum

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Abstract

Although expectations are key theoretical antecedents of emotion and behavior, they are typically examined as static properties without deep consideration of their temporal dynamics. By surveying residents over four time points during the month preceding a public referendum on cannabis legalization (California Proposition 19), we examined both the causes and consequences of their expectation trajectories regarding the vote’s outcome. Results point to the unique importance of individuals’ changes in electoral expectations over time. Specifically, more informed voters were especially likely to lower their expectations regarding the measure’s passage (in line with polling), although being informed about the election had less impact on expectation trajectories among those favoring the measure. Furthermore, supporters who maintained their optimism about the election outcome over time were more likely to vote and were more disappointed following the measure’s failure. The findings suggest that temporal changes in optimism play a unique role in social behavior.

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“Optimism is inevitably the last hope of the defeated.” -- Albert Meltzer

Scholars discovered long ago that voters tend to predict that their favored candidate will win (Hayes, 1932). This tendency to provide forecasts in accordance with preferences is extremely robust and has been systematically observed across decades of U.S. presidential elections and around the world (Granberg & Brent, 1983; Granberg & Holmberg, 1988), with correlations between preferences and expectations typically exceeding .50.

Such strong links between preferences and electoral expectations seem irrational, at least with respect to the unlikely winners; only supporters of the likely winner should have valid reasons for optimism. That supporters of unlikely winners are often optimistic suggests that voters sometimes fail to consider objective, election-relevant information (e.g., relevant polling data) when forming expectations. Consequently, studies have targeted knowledge of election-relevant issues as a constraint on the relationship between preferences and expectations (Dolan & Hollbrook, 2001; Granberg & Brent, 1983; Zaller, 1992). However, researchers have conceptualized and measured political knowledge in ways that are not equivalent, yielding findings that are difficult to interpret as a whole. Some studies rely on proxy variables such as educational attainment and political investment, but these variables are often ambiguous with regard to their relation to election-relevant knowledge. For example, a person can be educated and partisan yet apathetic and uninformed about politics (Granberg & Brent, 1983). Thus, it is important to measure knowledge directly through assessment of factual information relevant to the election (Deli Carpini & Keeter, 1993).
Although it is intuitive that accurate election-relevant knowledge would constrain the influence of preferences on expectations, evidence for this intuition has proved fickle. For example, in research on Israeli parliamentary elections, Babad (1995) observed that more informed political science students did not show a weaker link between their preferences and expectations, even when they were informed about the party seat differential going into the election (which always tilts the odds of winning one way or another). Similarly, even accurate knowledge of current poll results often fails to reduce this link, in part because poll results are discounted or “misremembered” in accordance with one’s own preferences (Babad, 1997, Kisilevsky & Levine, 2007). Even when knowledge successfully restrains the influence of preferences on expectations, it may do so only for people who are minimally invested in the political outcome (Granberg & Brent, 1983; see also Dolan & Holbrook, 2001).

Taken together, these findings suggest that knowledge may not, as initially assumed, always constrain the relationship between preferences and electoral expectations, particularly for people who are most invested in election results. Furthermore, these relationships are complex and depend on features of a given election (Irwin & Van Holsteyn, 2002; Meifert, Humber, Gschwend, & Urban Pappi, 2011), which may be particularly problematic in light of the heavy focus in this research area on presidential and parliamentary elections in the United States and Israel, respectively. Given the conflicting findings and limited evidence, the role of knowledge in shaping electoral expectations demands additional attention.

The Role of Expectation Trajectories

An additional key limitation of prior research is that it treats expectations as static properties. In other words, studies usually examine electoral expectations at one point in time and pay little attention to how they change as the election draws closer. As a result, previously
established links between expectations and knowledge speak only to patterns *across* individuals, not to the dynamics within an individual, although researchers’ interpretations often imply such intra-individual processes (Babad, 1995). This approach ignores the fact that people’s expectations, opinion polls, and political forces change throughout the run-up to an election. These changes are especially relevant in the weeks leading up to Election Day in light of the influence of expectations on voting behavior. For example, anticipating that a preferred candidate or ballot proposition will fail may keep supporters from coming out to vote, and anticipating that a candidate will win may lead voters to “get on the bandwagon” and support them (Mutz, 1998).

We thus conducted a study to examine *expectation trajectories*, or patterns of change in expectations within individuals, and how they reflect both individual differences and contextual variables. Specifically, we conceptualized electoral expectation trajectories as latent “growth curves” (Willet & Sayer, 1994). These curves represent functions assumed to underlie each individual’s change in expectations over time and are defined by the initial value of the function (i.e., the intercept) and a factor of change for that individual (i.e., the slope). Latent growth curve analysis allowed us to examine individual’s expectation trajectories by regressing these intercept and slope values on factors of theoretical interest (i.e., preferences and knowledge), and examine how the slope and intercept themselves shaped other relevant variables (i.e., turnout and emotion).

Using this approach, we examined expectation trajectories over the month preceding the November 2, 2010 vote on Proposition 19 in California (Prop 19) regarding cannabis legalization for recreational use. This proposition was a ballot measure brought to voters by a passionate group of supporters who collected over 700,000 signatures and mounted a large public campaign
(McKinley, 2009). Ultimately, the measure failed with 46.2% of Californians voting in support, although polling suggested likely passage until only a few of weeks before the vote, when public support dropped substantially (Van Oot, 2010, see Figure 1). This vote presented a perfect opportunity to examine the role of expectation trajectories in the context of voting behavior. Critically, it allowed us to examine the impact of preferences and knowledge on expectations by considering both inter-individual differences and intra-individual change in an election fraught with uncertainty (thus allowing for a large impact of voters’ biases, see Granberg & Brent, 1983). We examined these dynamics among a sample of California students and urban residents. Although not perfectly representative of California’s total voting base, the sample allowed us to examine processes of key theoretical importance in a consequential, real-world setting. Finally, by focusing on a public referendum, this research extends prior work on electoral expectations that focused almost exclusively on presidential and parliamentary elections.

**Hypotheses**

First, we hypothesized that supporters of Prop 19 would predict a higher likelihood of passage at the outset of the study than would opponents, in line with desirability biases (Krizan et al., 2010). We further anticipated that knowledge would constrain (i.e., interact with) the relationship between preferences and initial expectations (e.g., Dolan & Hollbrook, 2001; Kisilevsky & Levine, 2007), such that more knowledgeable voters would express more moderate expectations, regardless of their preferences.

Second, drawing on research indicating that people tend to forgo optimism as “the moment of truth” draws near (Sweeny, Carroll, & Sheperd, 2006; Sheperd, Ouellette, & Fernandez, 1996), we hypothesized that both supporters and opponents of Prop 19 would become more moderate in their expectations over time. Specifically, we anticipated that
supporters would judge the likelihood of passage to be lower over time, and opponents would judge the likelihood of passage to be higher over time, with both tendencies reflecting a shift toward pessimism (i.e., toward expectation of an undesirable outcome).

Third, we anticipated that participants who were more informed would be more attuned to changes in popular and political support for Prop 19. Because polls indicated a clear drop in popular support for Prop 19 during the month before the vote (Figure 1), we hypothesized that participants who were more informed about the election would report greater declines in their expectations of passage as they learned that popular opinion and political will had shifted. In addition, we examined whether preferences moderated the relationship between knowledge and expectation trajectories. We anticipated that supporters would experience tension between their preferences and a dawning realization that the measure was likely to fail and that as such even knowledgeable supporters would maintain high expectations of passage over time. In contrast, we anticipated that knowledgeable opponents of Prop 19 would readily lower (or keep low) their expectations of passage due to the consistency between their desires and the objective information indicating likely failure.

Fourth, we hypothesized that supporters who maintained their optimism despite a negative political headwind would be more likely to vote on Election Day as they would perceive their vote as consequential in a close race (Mutz, 1998). That is, we hypothesized that supporters with a “flatter” expectation trajectory would be more likely to vote. Finally, we examined the relationship between expectation trajectories and supporters’ disappointment in the ultimate failure of Prop 19. Although research finds that more optimistic expectations exacerbate disappointment for both personal and electoral outcomes (Krizan et al., 2010; van Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997; Sweeny & Shepperd, 2010), to our knowledge no research has directly examined
whether changes in expectations have an effect. A precipitous drop in expectations just prior to learning an outcome may shield people from disappointment (Sweeny & Shepperd, 2010; Sweeny et al., 2006). Thus, we hypothesized that a steeper drop in expectations of Prop 19’s passage would mitigate disappointment with the outcome of the vote among supporters.

Method

Participants

One-hundred and seventy five California residents were recruited from two sources based on their interest in Proposition 19. Ninety participants were California community residents recruited via Craigslist (Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, Palm Springs, and the Inland Empire) who responded to a listing entitled “Paid Research Study: Evaluate the 2010 Election” and focusing on “California Proposition 19 on cannabis legalization.” Interested parties e-mailed the researchers and were subsequently sent web links to the surveys following confirmation that the e-mail account was legitimate. Participants could earn up to $30 for completing all the surveys. Eighty-five participants were students from psychology courses at the University of California, Riverside who participated in exchange for course credit after responding to a similar advertisement. All participants were recruited between September 30 and October 12, 2010. Retention (89% at completion) was facilitated by making the full compensation contingent on continued participation.

Seventeen participants were removed from the analyses as they did not provide sufficiently complete or timely responses. This yielded a final sample of 158 participants (61% female, age range 18-75, $M_{age} = 25.6$, $SD_{age} = 10.5$) who provided responses over the entire course of the study in a timely manner. Forty-two percent were White/European-American, 26% Hispanic/Latino, 26% Asian, and 5% Black/African-American. The race/ethnicity of our sample
was similar to that of the population of California as reported by the 2010 census (40% White non-Hispanic, 38% Hispanic/Latino, 13% Asian, 6% Black/African-American; U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). Forty percent (most of the non-student sample) had a college degree.

**Procedures and Measures**

Data were collected in five waves. During the first assessment (October 3\(^{rd}\) - 12\(^{th}\)), participants provided electoral expectations (“In your opinion, how likely is it that Prop 19 will pass?” 1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely) and demographic information and answered questions regarding their knowledge of and preference for the measure. Preference was indicated in response to the item, “What do you want the outcome of the Prop 19 vote to be?” (1 = Strongly want it to fail, 4 = Don’t care, 7 = Strongly want it to pass). To assess proposition-relevant knowledge, participants responded to factual questions regarding Proposition 19 and its political status in California. Ten questions assessed general facts about Prop 19 (e.g., “On what date will the vote on Prop 19 take place?” “Would current laws regarding driving during cannabis intoxication change?”) and its political support (e.g., “Has the [California Democratic Party / National Black Police Association] officially endorsed Prop 19?”). Correct responses were summed to create an index of proposition-relevant knowledge. The number of correct responses across the items ranged from 31\% to 80\%, with the average item-total correlation Kendall’s Tau-\(b\) = .31 (range .05 - .45). The validity of the measure was supported by a positive correlation of .15 (\(p = .06\)) with educational attainment, a typical proxy variable for political knowledge (see Table 1 for additional descriptive statistics).

The subsequent three assessments occurred in roughly weekly intervals (October 18\(^{th}\) - 25\(^{th}\), October 25\(^{th}\) - 30\(^{th}\), and on November 2\(^{nd}\)) and each assessed expectations. The final assessment occurred between November 3\(^{rd}\) and 5\(^{th}\), during which participants reported whether
and how they voted (“How did you vote on Prop 19?” didn’t vote/voted yes/voted no) and indicated their reaction to the election outcome (“I feel disappointed with the outcome of the vote on Prop 19,” 1 = not at all, 7 = very much).

**Analytic Strategy**

To test our hypotheses about causes and consequences of expectation trajectories, we estimated latent growth curves using the Mplus 5.0 software (Muthen & Muthen, 2007). These curves represented repeated measures of expectations as a function of time and described each individual with a regression equation that modeled expectations as a function of a latent intercept (initial level) and slope (change). These individual functions were then aggregated to estimate the overall mean and variance for the intercept and slope, yielding summary information about change at the level of the group. This strategy allowed an examination of antecedents and consequences of expectation trajectories within a unitary modeling framework that accounts for both between-person and within-person variability.

**Results**

**Descriptive Statistics**

Before turning to our key results, we briefly consider general trends in the data (Table 1). First, most participants supported Prop 19, and as a result most expressed at least some disappointment in the outcome. Second, political knowledge varied considerably across participants (ranging from 1 to 10 correct), and was only weakly linked to Prop 19 support ($r = .16$). Aggregate expectations regarding the proposition’s likelihood of passage did not systematically change over the course of the study ($F = .13, p = .94$). Finally, 57% of participants reported voting on the measure (40% in favor, 17% against).
**Proposition Support and Knowledge**

We used full information maximum likelihood (FIML) procedures to estimate intercepts and linear slopes of expectation trajectories. To test our hypotheses regarding predictors of expectation trajectories, we regressed these parameters on Prop 19 preferences, knowledge, and their interaction term (centered). The model fit the data well (Figure 2), accounting for 44 and 48 percent of the variance in the intercept and slope, respectively.

Turning to the *intercept* of expectations, we confirmed our hypothesis that supporters of Prop 19 would be more optimistic about its ultimate passage. To illustrate the findings, we plotted the expectation trajectories for a moderate supporter and a moderate opponent of Prop 19 (those scoring 6 and 2 on our preference scale, respectively) as a function of knowledge (Figure 3). Although proposition-relevant knowledge did not significantly predict the initial level of expectations, the interaction term did. As seen in Figure 3, the relationship between initial level of expectations and knowledge was stronger among supporters, such that more knowledgeable supporters initially indicated a lower likelihood of passage than did less knowledgeable supporters. Knowledge was unrelated to expectations among opponents.

Regarding predictors of the *slope* of expectations, preferences predicted a more negative slope (Figure 2), such that supporters of Prop 19 lowered their expectations about the likelihood of passage over time, whereas opponents increased their expectations of passage (Figure 3). As hypothesized, both supporters and opponents became less optimistic with respect to their desired outcome, consistent with a drop in optimism typically observed prior to feedback about important outcomes.

Second, knowledge also predicted a more negative slope of expectations (Figure 2). Consistent with our hypothesis that informed participants would be more attuned to the drop in
popular support for Prop 19 throughout October, knowledgeable participants were more likely to lower their expectations of its passage (Figure 3).

However, these findings were qualified by a marginal interaction between Prop 19 preferences and knowledge, represented by a black circle in Figure 2. As illustrated by the trajectories in Figure 3, political knowledge predicted the slope of expectation trajectories less among supporters than among opponents of Prop 19. Specifically, supporters’ expectation trajectories were less sensitive to their level of knowledge, such that these participants maintained high expectations even when they were knowledgeable. In contrast, knowledgeable opponents of Prop 19 appropriately judged the likelihood of passage to be low as Election Day approached, relative to less knowledgeable opponents who judged passage to be more likely over time (consistent with the general tendency to become more reserved in expectations mentioned above).

**Voting Behavior and Disappointment among Supporters**

We also examined the consequences of expectation trajectories. First, to examine the relationship between trajectories and voter turnout we estimated the same model described previously but only for supporters (N = 102), thus eliminating the support variable and its interaction term from the analysis. Supporters were defined as individuals scoring above the mid-point (“don’t care”) on the preference scale. We regressed the likelihood of voting in support on knowledge and the intercept and slope of expectation trajectories. The model fit the data well, $\chi^2(10) = 5.97, p = .81, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00 (90\% CI = .00 - .07), SRMR = .07$, accounting for substantial variance, $R^2 = .46, p < .05$.

What factors predicted turning out to vote for Prop 19? First, greater knowledge predicted voting among supporters of Prop 19, $B = .11, SE = .04, p = .001$. This finding may reflect the fact
that more knowledgeable voters are more likely to vote consistently (Meifert et al., 2011). More critically, voting in support was also predicted by the slope of expectation trajectories, but not the intercept. Specifically, maintaining optimism about Prop 19’s passage (i.e., a shallower slope) predicted a greater likelihood of voting for Prop 19, $B = .92, SE = .44, p < .05$. Intercept did not significantly predict voting behavior ($p > .10$).

Second, to examine the relationship between expectation trajectories and disappointment with the election outcome we followed the same strategy, now including disappointment as the final dependent variable ($N = 95$). We also included the continuous preference measure to control for intensity of preferences among supporters, which likely influenced disappointment. This model also fit the data well, $\chi^2(12) = 11.17, p = .28$, $CFI = .99$, $RMSEA = .04$ (90% CI = .00 .12), $SRMR = .07$, accounting for substantial variance, $R^2 = .46, p < .01$. Greater knowledge was predictive of greater disappointment, $B = .22, SE = .11, p = .05$, again likely a function of the greater investment of knowledgeable voters. Unsurprisingly, stronger preferences exacerbated disappointment, $B = 1.04, SE = .26, p < .001$. More importantly, a shallower slope of expectation trajectories was significantly related to greater disappointment, $B = 2.94, SE = 1.27, p < .05$. The initial level of expectations (i.e., the intercept) showed a trend toward a relationship with disappointment but did not reach significance ($B = .17, SE = .24, p = .47$). In sum, supporters who maintained optimism about the outcome of the election were especially likely to be disappointed upon learning that Prop 19 failed.

**Discussion**

We identified key predictors and consequences of expectation trajectories in the first systematic investigation of these trajectories in an electoral context. First, we documented substantial variation in expectation trajectories between respondents. Individuals varied greatly
not only in their initial electoral forecasts; they also varied in the pattern of change in these forecasts. Consistent with prior findings (Granberg & Brent, 1998; Krizan et al., 2010), we found that preferences and not knowledge of election-relevant issues most strongly predicted initial expectations, although the link between preferences and expectations was somewhat weaker among more knowledgeable voters. Although desirability biases and motivated reasoning partially explain such preference-expectation links, they also reflect the constraints of biased exposure to other voters’ preferences, media sources, and general political information (Krizan et al., 2010). Regardless of the source, this finding reaffirms the central importance of electoral preferences in shaping expectations, but suggests that being informed constrains this tendency.

More importantly, we identified the unique importance of expectation trajectories in electoral contexts, illuminating both the antecedents and consequents of shifts in electoral expectations over the critical month before the vote. First, we confirmed that the tendency for people to become less optimistic as personal feedback approaches (Sweeny et al., 2006) extends to collective social outcomes such as elections. Specifically, we found a general trend for both sides to relinquish optimism about their desired outcome as the election drew near. This finding is noteworthy because electoral outcomes are quite different than personal performances; for example, campaigns typically invest substantial resources to maintain optimism among supporters to the bitter end, which may explain why electoral expectations do not always shift toward pessimism (Krizan et al., 2010).

Second, we found that people who were more knowledgeable about election-relevant issues were more likely to decrease their expectations for the proposition’s passage as Election Day approached. This pattern fits with the widely reported drop in popular support for Prop 19 between September and November of 2010 (Figure 1) and confirms that performance-based
measures of knowledge (as opposed to proxy measures such as educational attainment) have substantial utility when studying electoral expectations.

Third, we found that the influence of political knowledge on expectation trajectories was blunted among supporters of Prop 19, who maintained their optimism regarding passage despite weakened public support for the proposition in the final weeks before the election. Supporters likely experienced tension between their preferences and information suggesting the outcome would be unfavorable, but our results suggest that their preferences won the day and promoted maintenance of optimism. This finding further supports the conclusion that knowledge does not negate the influence of one’s preferences.

Equally important were the consequences of expectation trajectories. Among supporters of the measure, people who maintained optimism about Prop 19’s chances of passage were most likely to turn out and vote in favor. This finding speaks to the motivating power of positive expectations (Bandura, 1982) and affirms the value of intense efforts invested by campaigns toward maintaining optimism to the end. There is a price to be paid for maintaining optimism, however: sustaining optimistic expectations in the face of information suggesting the likelihood of failure exacerbated disappointment among supporters.

Implications

Taken together, our findings emphasize the theoretical utility of examining expectations as dynamic entities. Our examination of expectation trajectories confirmed prior findings regarding the power of preferences but also revealed that knowledge, at times, restrains optimism when changes in the facts call for such restraint. Furthermore, our study revealed supporters to be somewhat immune to the influence of their own knowledge, as their expectations remained high until the vote was cast regardless of how well-informed they were. Finally, resoluteness in
supporters’ expectations increased their likelihood of turning out for the vote but also of reacting with disappointment in the face of failure, suggesting that expectation trajectories predict consequences of key importance to political scientists. Taken together, these findings suggest that understanding individual-level change in expectations and its relation to personal and contextual factors should be a central focus for researchers studying likelihood judgments.
References


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Footnotes

1. We also examined the nature of the sample (student vs. online) as a moderating variable on effects presented in this paper but found no substantive effects.

2. Given data and a specified model, the method of maximum likelihood selects values of the model parameters to produce a distribution that gives the observed data the greatest probability (i.e., parameters that maximize the likelihood function). MPlus specifies intercept as a constant value (1) at each time point, and the slope as a step-function (0, 1, 2, 3) that models the temporal change across the four observed time points.

3. We also conducted the same analyses for opponents but found no significant effects.

4. An alternative approach is to operationalize turnout as whether a person voted, regardless of what for. In this analysis the slope similarly predicted behavior, $B = .59, SE = .37, p = .10$, although the relationship was marginally significant.
### Table 1

*Descriptive Statistics and Correlations among Variables (N = 158)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
<th>5.</th>
<th>6.</th>
<th>7.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Preference</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Knowledge</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Preference * Knowledge (cross-product)</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>0.68**</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Expectations at Time 1</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>0.49**</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.18*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Expectations at Time 2</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>0.37**</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
<td>0.52**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Expectations at Time 3</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.22*</td>
<td>-0.18*</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.53**</td>
<td>0.67**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Expectations at Time 4</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>0.27**</td>
<td>-0.22*</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
<td>0.51**</td>
<td>0.61**</td>
<td>0.72**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Disappointment</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>0.69**</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
<td>0.52**</td>
<td>0.36**</td>
<td>0.36**</td>
<td>0.25**</td>
<td>0.37**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01.
Figure 1. Public support for CA Proposition 19 during the month preceding the vote.

Note: The information in the graph is based on public opinion polling during late September and October 2010 that queried respondents about their support for CA Prop 19. Each data point represents an individual poll, and the date indicates the last day of the polling period. The bars represent margins of error, and a linear trendline has been superimposed over the data to illustrate the change in public support over time. From left to right, the polls were conducted by The Field Poll, Public Policy Institute of California, Survey USA, Ipsos, EMC Research, Public Policy Institute of California, Survey USA, Los Angeles Times/University of Southern California, Public Policy Polling, Suffolk University, Survey USA, The Field Poll, and Public Policy Polling (Wikipedia, 2010).
\chi^2(11) = 8.22, p = .69, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00 (90\% CI = .00 - .07), SRMR = .02

Figure 2. Relationship between of support and knowledge and the intercept and slope of expectation trajectories (N = 158). + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01. Pearson’s correlations appear to each side; all regression coefficients are un-standardized.
Figure 3. Plotted expectation trajectories as a function of Proposition 19 preferences and knowledge ($N = 158$). Intercepts and slopes were estimated separately for a hypothetical moderate supporter of Prop 19 (value of 6 on the preference scale, left) and a hypothetical moderate opponent (value of 2 on the preference scale, right). Trajectories for a person with low, average, and high knowledge (1 SD above the sample mean, at the mean, and 1 SD below the mean, respectively) were also estimated in each case, and these values were used to compute initial expectations and their change across the four time points.